Thiruvananthapuram: An emergency action plan for dams, tragically, is Kerala's best-kept secret. No one — not the district administration nor the dam safety authority or even the KSEB — is aware of its existence. So when disaster struck, what happened was essentially a frantic groping in the dark. Those who control the dams — KSEB and the irrigation department — had a fair idea when to issue the alerts, at least in the case of the major dams, but had no clue how to go about softening the impact.

But there was also the scale of the event that could have made any action plan or standard operating procedure shockingly irrelevant. More than one-third of the inflow that the dams received in an entire year accumulated in the state's reservoirs in just four days.

Between August 14 and 17, Idukki and Kakki dams received more than double the normal rainfall. From August 1 to 19, the state had received 758.6 mm of rain, an excess of 164 per cent. Normally during this period we get only 287.5mm. Between August 9 and 15, Thiruvananthapuram received an excess of 617 per cent; Pathanamthitta, 247 per cent; Idukki, 438 per cent; Ernakulam, 310 per cent; Palakkad, 278 per cent, and Kollam 527 per cent.

“It would be ludicrous to insist on following certain warning procedures in a crisis of this magnitude and one that could strike only once in a 100 years," said James Wilson, the state's special officer for inter-state water issues. He said there were just three types of emergency plans: for a normal monsoon year, for a drought or lean year, and for a normal flood situation. “What happened now was beyond all predictions,” Wilson said.

District collectors, as a result, responded differently to the crisis. Some issued all sort of warnings, while others, perhaps not to stoke a mass scare and also going by the past alerts that came to nothing, sat on the warnings.

Variable wisdom

Take the case of Idukki collector K Jeevan Babu, for instance. Right after the 'orange' alert was issued by the KSEB in Idukki on July 30, he had directed revenue and local body officials to visit the 200-odd houses that would be immediately affected in case the shutters of Cheruthoni dam had to be opened, and inform them of the danger. “We were not following any protocol. We just thought it wise to prepare the people for any eventuality,” the collector said. In fact, he had no idea whether any such protocol existed, forget about standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Also read: Kerala floods | Before and After

Up north on the east, in Palakkad, collector D Balamurali reacted differently. Four spillways of the Malampuzha dam, the state's largest irrigation dam, were lifted three centimetres on August 1. Though a 'red' alert was issued, he did not want to create panic. Such 'red' alerts were issued regularly, the most recent was on June 15. And the rain did not look threatening. People in areas that could be affected were only told not to cross the Bharathapuzha, also not to wash or bathe along its banks — standard warnings that people have long grown immune to.

But near midnight on August 8, after a massive landslide in the Walayar-Akamalavaram sector, the collector was told that there was no choice but to lift the shutters almost fully, by a dragon-mouth width of 105 cm. His reaction time: less than 30 minutes. The floodwater swept through areas not even marked in the inundation maps of the irrigation department. Thanks to some swift action, and luck, there were no casualties. Elsewhere, in Alappuzha, Pathanamthitta and Ernakulam districts, the floods had submerged the most unlikely places.

Further north, in Wayanad, the collector was not even informed when the shutters of Banasura Sagar were lifted, neither on June 15 nor on August 7. Chief minister Pinarayi Vijayan himself is on record saying that there was no need. “These are small dams for which alerts need not be given,” the chief minister had said.

Authorities in the dark

Leave alone the collectors, even the Dam Safety Authority is in the dark about the steps to be followed once humongous quantities of water burst out of the dams. “This was not a situation we had anticipated because we generally have only drought years, and therefore I am not sure whether any response protocols exist,” said Dam Safety Authority chairman C N Ramachandran. “Our mandate is to periodically inspect the dams, see whether encroachments have taken place, and also to assess the changes that have taken place in dams, especially after monsoon and during the peak of summer when cracks develop on the surface,” the chairman said.

In short, protecting the lives and property of people living downstream of the dams are beyond the authority's remit. It was not the responsibility of the State Disaster Management Authority either. “Issuing alerts and emergency operations are the responsibility of the KSEB,” said Dr Sekhar Kuriakose, head of the State Emergency Operations Centre.

Dam spill vs monster rains

KSEB, too, is unwilling to take the blame. “Not all the waters that engulfed the state came from KSEB's dams,” said KSEB's dam safety chief engineer Bibin Joseph. “We have done a preliminary assessment using the river gauging facilities of the irrigation department and have found that a considerably large portion of the floodwaters had come from outside the catchment areas of KSEB dams,” he said.

In Pampa, he said the spill from Kakki dam accounted for just 30 per cent of the water in the flooded river. He said that nearly 7,500 cubic metre per second or cumecs (75 lakh litres per second) passed under the Bhoothathankettu irrigation barrage over the Periyar during August 16 and 17. “Of this, only 3000 cumecs came from our dams on the Periyar like Idukki and Idamalayar,” he said.

Bibin Joseph said what happened downstream the Banasura Sagar dam in Wayanad was more telling. On August 8 when the dam discharged 216 cumecs, downstream in Muthankara where there is a river gauging station, the flow was 1,018 cumecs. The next day, the discharge from Banasurasagar was 246 cumecs, and downstream in Muthankara the flow was 2250 cumecs. “It is the high-intensity of the rain that has done this and not the discharge from the dams as is being claimed,” the dam safety chief engineer said.

Buried SOPs

While all are busy evading accountability, what has gone unnoticed are the standard operating procedures (SOPs) issued by the Central Water Commission as recently as 2016 for evolving an emergency action plan for dams. The guidelines have addressed even the most common complaint raised by authorities: there is no time to think of protocol or procedures when the water has reached your front door.

Here is what the CWC guidelines, made mandatory for states, say on the issue: “There may be cases where some of the population settlements are located very close to the dam, and the time available after 'red' emergency notification may not be sufficient for their evacuation. In such cases and for the mentioned limited settlements, preparation for evacuation and the actual evacuation may be linked with the 'blue' level and 'orange' level emergency alerts, respectively.” Except for Idukki, this has not happened anywhere.

How the warnings are to be given are also stated. “The warning may be given through speakers, sirens or hooters adequately in advance of dam releases (minimum 15 minutes). The warning system shall be backed up by alternate power sources so as to avoid its malfunctioning in case of power failure. The sirens/hooters shall be distinguishable from other common sounds (such as from VIP vehicles, fire brigades, ambulances etc.).”

There are clear guidelines on what to do during each stages of alert. Blue: monitor situation closely. Orange: warn population downstream, ask them to prepare for evacuation. Red: immediate evacuation.

Unmapped disaster

Most importantly, the CWC has asked the entities controlling the dam — KSEB, irrigation department and Kerala Water Authority — to evolve 'inundation maps' that show areas that could be submerged in the most extreme situation, when a dam breaks. KSEB has done this partially for Idukki and Kakki dams. Even these 'extreme situation' maps have not shown Pandalam and Chengannur as potential flooding zones.

Even the initial alerts issued for Idukki dam had stated that people living in 200m radius of Periyar river should stay away and later it was changed to 500m. However, in Kalady, some 90 km downstream, the water inundated even the Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, which is almost 1km away from Periyar River. Again, the people were not told in detail how much water is expected to rise on the banks of Periyar River or Pamba. Villagers along the Periyar banks were also not aware whether the alerts were talking about aerial or road distance, thanks to the vague language official alerts use.

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